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The Goderich Signal-Star, 1969-10-09, Page 12• n, A (O !OtU R SIGNAL -STAR, THURSDAY, OCT' OBER 9, 1969 BLUE THUMB • BY G. MacLEOD ROSS Scepticismis the first attribute of criticism, and it is in a spirit of scepticism that this apprediation, of American embroilment in Vietnam , is attempted. The propriety of discussing our very good Ally's actions lies. in the incontrovertible truth that satellites stand or fall as a result of the policies of their sun. Appreciations usually start ▪ with the Objective. In this instance the U.S. Objective seems to vary from day to day. At the moment of writing it seems to be directed more at how to extricate the U,S. Forces in South Vietnam with honour, than to the original purpose of arresting the inroad of Communism. in that country, and it is symptomatic of the considerable' change in outlook that this adventure is no* .characterised as a predicament. For the moment then, the Bresident's objectives seem to be sevral: f. To reduce American participation in South Vietnam. 2. To reduce American casualties. .3. To leave South Vietnam independent of the North OR, 4. To leave South Vietnam with a coalition government. (Part National Liberation Front if necessary.) 5. To'' pacify antiwar • propaganda in the U.S.A. 6..To maintain U.S. prestige both at home and abroad. Hanoi's objectives are inflexible. First to achieve a united .Vietnam, and 2. To inflict decisive defeat on the U.S. Forces. i.e. effect an American -Dien Bien Phu. Saigon's. objective's are as variable as those of the U.S. General Thieu's latest (29 9 ) pronunciamento is for an independent South,with or without American aid. This seems designed more to 'embarrass the U.S. than to impress Hanoi with the military potential of the South; the ARVN. A vital, but unspecified objective of • the quasi- representative regime in Saigon is undoubtedly. to ensure the free flow of the river of U.S. ,dollars indefinitely.. The Soviet's 'objective is arming Hanoi to the tune of a billion dollars to date is the well established Soviet game of fighting this battle in the Cold` War to the last North Vietnamese, bleedi ig the U.S. at the same time, ani keeping her occupied in the Fit East, while the Soviet continues its fell ideals in ,the Mediterranean and Near East. Red China which has, supported Hanoi to date up to $200 million, has now signed 'a further agreement for a non-refundable loan for economic and military purposes. The Policies open to the President are: 1. Immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops. 2. Graduated withdrawal, leading to an irreducible 200,000 specialists to be , left behind in South Vietnam. 3. Negotiation to achieve a politically free South Vietnam. Or, 4. Negotiation to reconcile the Viet .Cong (National Liberation Front or N.L.F.) with Saigon in a South Vietnam independent of Hanoi. 5. To fight with all required resources until Hanoi gives in. 6. A combination of some of the above. ' As things . stand, both Objectives and Policies are compromised by uncertainty as to how the several reagents: "Hanoi; Saigon; the Soviet; China; American opinion and World opinion, will perform individually or in consort. Let us examine the Policies open to the President, one by one. 1.. IMMEDIATE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL At the present moment, with a balanced army of 500,000 men, withdrawal could probably, be effected with small casualties. despite the possibility that the. ARVN I the South Vietnamese troops.) would mutiny and join the Viet Cong and the Hanoi regulars in an effort to bring off _another Dien Bien Phu. [This possibility is • supported,.,.•...,by information that the U.S. Command ,has already prepared plans for such a contingency. Furthermore, two recent failures, by. ARVN to come to the aid of hard. pressed U.S. troops at Ben Het, and later in an ambush. Predicament in Vietnam both support this possibility.] Such total withdrawal by -the U.S would keep their casualties to a minimum, but it would fail to achieve either a politically independent South, or even a coalition. It is 'possible the fighting would cease, at least on the present scale, though the possibility of massacres, on the scale of those perpetrated during the Indian Independence, aright result to South Vietnamese. However, it is also possible such cessation of military operations would 'be more acceptable to the masses of South Vietnam, than the declared intention of General Thieu to fight on for political independence. The effect of such. U.S. action on world opinion is,debateable, but the American public would probably welcome its It would ,naturally underline the mistake of intervention into Vietnam, but to most observers this becomes more apparent even' day. Hanoi .would be left with a Ytnited Vietn.m, but would be denied the satsifaction of a decisive defeat of U.S. forces. 2. GRADUATED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL This second policy seems to be that selected officially for the moment and a token withdrawal of U.S. troops has begun. This , policy: having, regard to the reportedly doubtful loyalty of the ARVN troops to replace those U.S. troops withdrawn, seems to admit that the original .prime American objective of an independent South, has- . been changed to one which emphasises a challenge 'to the ARVN to show their' mettle, once and for all. In other words the sop once thrown towards Saigon is now directed to Arntrican public opinion. But, -,if such proves to be the case, will not every Ame ican soldier killed in the protea ted future be deemed an even greater sacrifice to au illconsidered adventure. than the 41,000 dead to date, when U.S.. policy was clearly „LIONS' PEANUT DRIVE OCTOBER 9 Do you have any questions about Ontario's Health Insurance plans? Otero Dep rtme st Health ONTARIO F AUR SERVICES IIlSlIRAIICE. PLAN /Mobile'inforfriptlon Centre OurMobiIe lnforrnatLonCentre is in Goderich MON IHEAL SiHEEc AF I ITE—SrILTAIRS October 16 with the answers No matter how many questions you have, and most of us have a few, the friendly people at our OHSIP van will be glad to give you the answers. It's surprising how quickly they can clear up any problem areas 'yqu may have with regard to OHS"IPr the_ new .Ontario Health Services Insurance 'Plan which becomes effective October 1st. Or perhaps you have questions concern 1ngyou rOntario Hospital Insurance coverage. It won't take long for you to get a complete pictureof the services offered by these Ontario Health Insurance Plans. So drop in for a personal discus- sion. It's to your benefit. ONTARiO HEALTH SERVICES INSURANCE PLAN 21195 Yonge Street, Toronto independence'? Are, not these losses to be likely to exacerbate American opinion to even higher degrees of heat than have been seen to date.'? But let us examine this.policy further. Some 200,000 U.S. troops are to be left behind by 1972. The composition of the 500,000, U.S. troops now in Vietnam consists of some 166,000 combat troops. The remaining two thirds are support troops; what the Romans used to call "inpediment,i.” They supply artillery, air, signals, engineer and supply duties. "In order to function the "impedimenta" has to be protected by combat troops. The 200,000 U.S. support troops to be finally left in Vietnam as a hostage to continuing American interest in that country, will rely for their protection on the ARVN. B.y about October 1972, or just prior to the presidential election which Mr. Nixon hopes to win, these American supply troops will be all that remains of the great U.S. military effort of the sixties.. Bearing in mind the delicately poised loyalties of the ,ARVN, and the fact that 35 percent of the civilian population of the South is known to be sympathetic to the NLF, the ' ontinuing''curityy of these U.S. •r troops will become a cause for serious niititary concern. In fact it seems just possible this second policy might well give Hanoi the decisive defeat for, which it lusts • and for which it is prepared to wait. The prestige of the U.S.A. aside, such a debacle would send American military advisers to the bottom of the class. Imagine the price Hanoi would exact for the return of such a hoard of prisoners, and •whatever world •opinion might be, it could well cause rebellion- in the .U,S.A. 'Furthermore it woulcV` entail inevitably, instant and massive reintervention by U.S. troops to salvage what was "left of the ..impedimenta." This policy then, ensures 'hone of the objectives of the President. It may be effective for a time as a political anaesthetic for the American people, but it will certainly not divert Hanoi, especially with a .presidential election protruding once again, to force the American card. 1n conception it seems only"to play I'ian.oi's game. 3. NEGOTIATION FOR.AN INDEPENDENT SOUTH." Policy Number Three , not being a military problem, no arguments can be usefully advanced. Suffice it to consider Hanoi's success to date. Why should - she agree' to an independent South when she has shown ° she can withstand the major military might of the most powerful western , power? General Thieu.'s declaration that he will fight on, with or without the U.S.A., may be true, but it does notfollow that he will subdue Hanoi's desires for a united Vietnam. 4. NEGOTIATION' FOR A COMPROMISE An offer to Hanoi to admit the Viet Cong to representation in the ~ Saigon government, subject to a free vote, appears possible, since the U.S. can screw General Thieu?s., arm' if need be. But why should Hanoi agree to such a compromise? Arid if they did, Who would trust their word? The U.S. would be faced with a second Korea, where 20 years after the armistice, 50,000 U.S. troop are still tied up and peace is no, nearer. Undoubtedly a compromise government would entail the presence of U.S. combat troops indefinitely to counter any Hanoi intransigence. One of the greatest misunderstandings under which the newly fledged "Pax Americana" has operated, has been its failure to realise that the rules of the game recognised by the East are totally different to those to which the West adheres. For the East no holds are barred; be they moral or physical and, they have no public opinion to assuage. From every aspect this seems to be a policy of despair. A diminution of the blood letting perhaps; a lessening of expenditure, but once again, playing the Soviet game of tying up packets of U.S. troops' far from home. CONCLUSIONS'. Gradual withdrawat of U.S.. troops ` until only specialists remain is compromised by the possibility of military disaster, followed' . by massive reintervention, but without political gain. The effect on American public opinion would be catastrophic. Reliance on the ARVN, as on the Saigon regime, seems equally unsound, more especially when the flow of U.S. dollars is staunched to a rate which fails to satisfy the inbred avarice of the Saigon; regime. The political objective of an independent South is only attainable at the price of the present scale of U.S. intervention. Anything less only serves to play Hanoi's waiting game, convinced as she is that some day the fruit will rot and drop. • Thus we conclude there is no halfway house. The decision is between the American people and the people. of South Vietnam. If you decide to satisfy the latter, the only policy is to maintain U.S. Forces at, the present scale indefinitely. To satisfy , the former, only immediate withdrawal will suffice. That is, a quick and total evacuation, tint's reducing casualties, aiid gaining the ability to live to fight another day when the stakes are commensurate with the effort involved, and where the, terrain favours the use of modern weapons. 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