HomeMy WebLinkAboutThe Goderich Signal-Star, 1970-03-05, Page 170A.;
IE THI
BY G. MacLEOD ROSS
1 •da lot suppose that anyone
will quarrel, with the contention
that the war •in Vietnam is
anteing , the most puzzling
ebnfrontations of modern times;
times which war has been the
rule rather than the exception.
This War has been the, subject. of
several.P. reports re orts iir this
column• and as time goes uby,
More.r :.and " more ', revealing
information comes to light, yet
none ., seems, to state the basic
rolle s once and for all
p m. None
explains how the conditions
encountered in this war make it
as hopeless, in terms of achieving
• what we call "Victory," as
trying to kill a hydra"by cutting
off its heads. The affair at, what
has been labelled "Pinkville" has
undoubtedly spurred several
reporters to become a 4ittle more
s coherent;. to give us a little more
background information, so that
we are enabled to judge the
more recent revelations of, fact
with greater understanding.
- As this is written the
`Pinkville affair" is sub judice,
nevertheless it can be -saidthat,°
the actions *of an Ally deserve •
closer scrutiny than those of an -
enemy. When a Vietnamese
murders a Vietnamese it is
terrible enough. But when an
American murders a Vietnamese,
that—is—absolutely unacceptable._
• If this implies a double standard,
it is the ideal implicit in the very
presence of the Americans in
Vietnam. The more this
distinction is obscured 'by their
conduct, the harder it. is to
justify: the American purposein
that country. •
Apart from obscuration of.
the facts, there is a further
obstacle to a sound appreciation
of the- situation o in Vietnam due
to the .chief actors having, to:
. speak in parables. Perhaps this is
why so many corrimentators
live to constantly explain what
the President meant after he
Spoke. `What does seem certain is
that military victory, in •the
• sense of routing Hanoi and the
Viet Cong, is impossible,
although this was the original
reason for "going in," overlaid
with the theory that the collapse
of outh- Vietnam"Would 'aspen
the ' flood gates.,,, so othat,'
C mi ism would pour
throughout South East Asia.
There. was even a hint that the
imposition of Arherican. ideals
would be for South Vietnam's
good.
Thus, if we believe the
President has renounced military
victory, has he given up the
`futile idea of a crusade? And
why the threat to re -escalate -the
war? Is he- trapped by the
propaganda that America must
not "lose:3' . Must he try td
•�
^ Y
!MB
Prop
justify the bad advice the .n
military -.. leadersgave his
rens re
was ordered to direct artillery
against a' village because "three
decessors? VC's were reported there this .
morning." He got up over ,the
CIRCUMSTANCES RELEVANT
TO PINKVILLE
unaP'i`ikville leaves all -manner of
nswered questions; almost'as -
many- . as, left by the estrange
`reticence' at"Chappailtitidick •
Why was_ the `report of ' the' ..
alleged -- -massacre� so-: .long.
delayed? How did it coupe tube
ordered, „ or at least acquiesced '
in? The. following g backgroundn
d
information May. help to explain
some of the incomprehen'sibili
ties, for Pinkville appears as an
unusually pure example of the
nature of the -war in Vietnam;
something'' . which ' • derives
specifically from the use of raw
infantry on what should . have
been a police operation in a
foreign country.
The Pinkville unit, Charlie
Company, 1st Battalion 20th
Infantry Regiment, 11.th
Infantry Brigade, is part of the
Americala Division, which . was
formed at the end of 196? from
several infantry units, cobbled
together and' thus named: The
name was also used in the last
World War for .a very scruffy
°collection of oddments, and
morale suffered somewhat. It
was men of this Division, who,
last year, refused to obey battle
orders.
Then Quang Ngai, the area
itself, is a province from which
escape . into the mountains is
convenient. •It was always a
centre of rebellion against the
Q French; before the Viet Cong,.it_
was the Viet Minh who ruled it.
Far from Saigon, the last
election proved that the voters
of Quang-Ngai had never heard
of Marshal . Ky..The • attitude of
the people of this area is best"
indicated by -s saying in other.
parts of ;,the country, passage
through a village on a
search-anLd-destroy mission
would bring out children
grinring .and begging for'gum._In
Quang Ngai they looked you in
the 'eyes; and hissed Americans;-
action which upset the young
— conscripts who had been told
they would get a welcome from
1.. -the inhabitants. ' . ' .. a Mme•
And yet te,,,waros waged is
not all heartless indiscriminate
slaughter. Take the recorded
case. of a F.A.C.; (Forward Air
` Contror)-one of those who fly
around in little Cessnas, with
authority to call down strikes,
after approval by the province
chief or, in .emergency, when ,
friendly troops are, involved, on
their own initiative. A mistaken
identification and the F.A.C. can,
kill a lot 'of innocent people.
One such FAC thought he had
flown his last mission, when he
vpMage, looked down and saw
Then, 'women and, children
walking . about. He radioed the
artillery position which was
holding its fife, saying he could .'
not see WPM reselnbting a_VC,
Did ...the province chief' really
hit? They- radioed.:
back that .the province chief
really did, and asked for the
'Co-ordinates t o ill e I
of- h village. ,
g
sent them back," said the FAC.
".'You .must have- seen a great
many people killed." "No. None
got killed Nobody was in the
area to which I directed "the
f-lre.'1
COMPUTERIZED
EXTERMINATION
.11ow does the U.S. *Army,
after more than a decade of
warfare, decide accurately the
allegiance of particular people in
particular areas? Hopelessly
thwarted in its attempts to"
improve information' input, the
V.S. Command in Saigon has
devoted its. most skilled
resources to rendering" its
i n formation `pro-cessing'
u I tra-sophisticated. It has
invented .what in effect' is ' a
computerized "Extermination
Machine." This' machine has.;
operated since March 1968. Its
heart is a computer, believed. to
be at , Bien Hoa, into which -the
High Command feeds data over
the' whole range of intelligence
needed to 'fight a war: American
targets; estimated VC forces;
field intelligence; fires observed,
etc. This mush is fed into the
computer and churned up to
produce a list of targets in 'order
of 'likelihood• of the presence of
Viet Cong. It is all. superbly
mathematical and whilst each
scientifically selected raid gives a
calculable, but • never a
calculated, • change of killing
civilians in the process, this is,.
acceptable to the Americans: -
' The effect is to alienate the
Americans tom the people still
further, ' deepening . the.
infdrmation famine ° which
' forced reliance on . this
" `scientifi'c' . slaughter in the- first
i.place. A'op �: : t
The latest information is that-.
the High Comthand,in Saigon is
extending' the idea, to computer
selection of -individuals. It is to
be the modern version of the
Roman `pricking' of those to be
eliminated. This year, for
example, it is estimated, 33,000
individual civilians, whom the
computer determined as VC
sympathizers, will be eliminated.
This will give some idea of the
pass to which the Americans
0
have been reduced because of
lack Of inform boli, The Viet
Cong -on the other hand, do not
need computers to identify their
victir>is, consequently their
massacres are less• random in
character, and therefore an
impressive factor in a peasant's
determination of which side to
.back.
The , rear horror o
f , the -
American oera ion _ Vietnam"
is not the sum of ' its oft
remarked faults: inexperienced
infantry; bureaucratic rivalry:;
gross defects of` intelligence;
unseleccivity of firepower —it is
quite simply that a- technology
df war has been evolved which,
even if staffed at every level by
paragonsof expertise and virtue;
cannot be anythingbut
atrocious, `
Once again the --questions
arise: How can the Americans
pacify a people from whom they
are - isolated by language,
customs, knowledge of the
terrain; a country they have
never entered , before ' and over
which they have- no political
control. And how, after a decade
of warfare, can the allegiance of
•particular people in particular
areas be determined accurately?
Incidents .akin to Pinkville. are
considered . by Malaysian
anti -guerilla experts as being
something which derives
,secifically from the use of raw
infantry on a police operation in
a foreign country, something on
which troops should never be
used, ' without the assistance of
police. And the use of the word.
`police' means in this ' instance
good local information: The
Malaysian problem . was solved
- under totally ,different
conditions to those in Vietnam.
Here the British had been in the
country for years; they had
established a police force of.
considerable , efficiency and
loyalty, officered by men who
-spoke the native languages, knew
the geography and rnanytof the
people, both for and against
authority. The conditions into
which the. Americans allowed
themselves to be• sucked -in.
• Vietnam were entirely different,
for here the `civil power' was
suspect from the beginning; it
• had no particular the,
for
the Americans, and certainly
-owed them no loyalty. The
result was . that American
intelligence suffered. The 'war'
became an horrific game of
blind=man's;buff. The
commonest element extant was
Frustration, so that when, ill
disciplined conscripts did at last
corner `enemy', they did not
discriminate.
However, none of the excu, s
which can be 'made for the
actions of 'raw troops', devoid of
information (intelligence), can
n
Vietn�m
excuse the ghastly lack of
perception by the American
General Staff in countenancing
the use of troops under the
prevailing circumstances,
What advice did the Chief of
Staff give the -Executive
(Commander in Chief) in the
early stages of this dismal affair, ,
Was the Chief of Staff .overruled ,
by the Cominander"in Chief (the
er
President)..aridordered ->;d,.._ed to
send the roo � 's? The:an rs to
such questions will ado not 'ng
to alleviate the conditions,:, a
they stand today jn Vietnam,
but surely we ought to learn
some sort of lesson and take it
to heart. That is, if the mightiest
power in the West is to become a
bit lighter on its, feet. Steps
should he taken to see that such"
irresponsibility cannot happen
again, and this in turn, throws
up- the pregnant question: Is it in
the best interests of the United
States for the. President to
double as, the Commander in
Chief?
THE NEW STRATEGY
South Vetnarese government is
more stable than. fpr a number
of years, and its performance is
becoming more effective, so that
any idea of a COALITION
WITH THE`" National.iberation
Front is now quite out of the
quesstion,
The • several other factor`s
which affect the end. of the war
are `hard to" predict, thoughit is
possible to see an -end position
where . U.S, support will be
limited:to specialized troops, tpt
it must, be realized too, that no
'Commander -in -Chief will leave' a'
technical force without combat
troops to, protect it. This is. what
Mr..- Laird means when he talks
about,a `residual force.'
Sir Robert believes the final
vista might well ,be control by
`the government of the South
over most of the country, to the
extent that rehabilitation could
proceed. Up to date the North
Vietnamese position has been
that of infiltrators, supporting
subversive (VC) movement
The change which has
occurred, in the strategy since
• the Tet offensive of 1968 is that
both the South Vietnamese and -
the Americans are doing mare ,to-;--
coritain the North Vietnamese
units which are operating oh the
Laos, and Cambodian borders
- and on the DMZ. (Demilitarized
Zone) At the same time they are.
devoting more effort -in support
of the pacification program..
-There has also been more
co=ordination of planning
between the South Vietnamese
and the:Americans.
After the ' Tet - offensive a
vacuum arose in the countryside, ,
since both sides tended 'to
• concentrate their forces back on
the cities. However this vacuum
had an attracting power which
resulted in the people welcoming
the ,'government back into the
countryside. As a consequence,
`manpower „ resources • have
becoine' availa13le ' to` the
government, rather than to the,"
Viet Cong as hitherto.
Sir Robert Thompson, was
recently commissioned by the
Presidentto go to Vietnam and
make a report. He finds the
whole balance of, power has
,changed, " since .':the North
Vietnamese •- troops are
understrength due to casualties
not having been made up. Thus
while the North's intentions are
the same, their capability has
been lessened. •.. They lost the
cream of, their army last year
and while they may be able to
mount another offensive, it 'is
doubtful whether - they ."can
sustain it.
On the political _ side,. Sir
Robert reports, — for this is a
two-sided war the present
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within the South, If-- tkat
move tent can be eliminated,
then . the North are -in the'
position of being , convdntional
invaders across the border; a
situation which would alter the
whole pattern of the War. This is
what Sir Robert's report to the
President _ meant when it said:'
p
"A- ,w1pning. ,position, in the
sense of obtaining, a just peace,.
. _ e
whethernegotiated 3r -not, -arca
of maintaining an independent
non-communist South Vietnan
has e':achieved, t ` .
nbu we are
be
not through yet." ' - a
[Based, on Sir Robert
Thompson's report; lettere to
the `Sunday Times'; and other
news reports.]
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